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OPINION

RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
We address the proper interpretation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)—specifically,
whether the conditional nature of an alien’s lawful permanent
resident status affects his eligibility for a waiver of
inadmissibility under INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
Under § 212(h)’s aggravated felony bar, “an alien who has
previously been admitted to the United States as an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” who is later
convicted of an aggravated felony, is statutorily ineligible for
a waiver of inadmissibility. Id. We must decide whether an
alien admitted as a lawful permanent resident on a conditional
basis (“Conditional LPR”) qualifies as “an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence” for purposes of § 212(h).
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The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) answered that
question in the affirmative and, therefore, held that Petitioner
Ka A. Paek was statutorily ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver
because he had committed an aggravated felony after his
admission as a Conditional LPR. We agree and will deny the
petition for review.
I.

BACKGROUND

Paek is a native and citizen of South Korea. On June
5, 1991, Paek was admitted to the United States at a port of
entry as a Conditional LPR. The basis for Paek’s admission
was his mother’s marriage to a U.S. citizen and member of
the U.S. military, thereby qualifying Paek as an “alien son.”
See INA § 216(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(h)(2) (“The term
‘alien son or daughter’ means an alien who obtains the status
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence
(whether on a conditional basis or otherwise) by virtue of
being the son or daughter of an individual through a
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qualifying marriage.”). Pursuant to § 216(a)(1), an “alien
son” “shall be considered, at the time of obtaining the status
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, to have
obtained such status on a conditional basis subject to the
provisions of this section.” INA § 216(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1186a(a)(1).
On July 5, 2000, after an appropriate petition was
filed, Paek’s immigration status was adjusted. See INA
§ 216(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1) (describing the
requirements “for the conditional basis . . . for an alien spouse
or an alien son or daughter to be removed”). His status was
adjusted to that of a non-conditional lawful permanent
resident (“Non-conditional LPR”).
In 2005 and 2006, Paek was convicted of receiving
stolen property, theft, and, relevant here, first degree robbery
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in violation of Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 832(a)(2). 1 After
removal proceedings were initiated against him, Paek applied
for adjustment of status on the basis of his own marriage to a
U.S. citizen. He also sought a waiver of inadmissibility
pursuant to § 212(h).
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that, inter
alia, Paek was statutorily ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver
pursuant to the aggravated felony bar:
No waiver shall be granted under this
subsection in the case of an alien who has
previously been admitted to the United States as
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence if . . . since the date of such admission

“A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when the
person commits the crime of robbery in the second degree
and when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of
immediate flight therefrom, the person or another participant
in the crime: . . . (2) Displays what appears to be a deadly
weapon or represents by word or conduct that the person is in
possession or control of a deadly weapon . . . .” Del. Code
Ann. tit. 11, § 832(a). On appeal, Paek does not dispute that
this offense constitutes an aggravated felony; therefore, we do
not address that issue.
1
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the alien has been convicted of an aggravated
felony . . . .
INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ determined that
Paek’s conviction for first degree robbery was an aggravated
felony pursuant to INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), and that Paek was convicted of this
aggravated felony after the date he was admitted as a
Conditional LPR (i.e., after June 5, 1991). Paek attempted to
circumvent the aggravated felony bar by arguing that the bar
does not apply to persons initially admitted as Conditional
LPRs, but the IJ rejected this argument.
Paek appealed to the BIA. “The only issue on appeal
[was] whether the aggravated felony bar applies to an alien
who was admitted at a port of entry as a conditional
permanent resident under section 216(a) of the [INA].” (App.
5.) In a published decision, the BIA determined that the bar
did apply. The BIA reached its decision based on the plain
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language of § 216, but it also relied on a supporting
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 216.1, 2 and a decision of this Court,
Gallimore v. Attorney General, 619 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2010).
The BIA’s analysis led it to conclude that Paek is subject to
the aggravated felony bar and is statutorily ineligible for a
§ 212(h) waiver. Paek petitioned for review.
II.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction over Paek’s question of law. See

INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also
Guzman v. Att’y Gen., 770 F.3d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 2014)
(“Our review is limited to constitutional claims and questions
of law.”). “We review legal questions de novo, with
“A conditional permanent resident is an alien who has been
lawfully admitted for permanent residence within the
meaning of section 101(a)(20) of the Act, except that a
conditional permanent resident is also subject to the
conditions and responsibilities set forth in section 216 or
216A of the Act, whichever is applicable, and part 216 of this
chapter. . . . All references within this chapter to lawful
permanent residents apply equally to conditional permanent
residents, unless otherwise specified.” 8 C.F.R. § 216.1.
2
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appropriate deference for the BIA’s reasonable interpretations
of statutes it is charged with administering.” De Leon-Ochoa
v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under the
familiar two-step Chevron inquiry, first, if the statute is clear
we must give effect to Congress’ unambiguous intent, and,
second, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a
specific issue, we defer to an implementing agency’s
reasonable interpretation of that statute.” Id. (citing Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984)).
III.

DISCUSSION

Paek urges that, because he was initially admitted as a
Conditional LPR, he has not “previously been admitted to the
United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.” See INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). He
reasons that the conditional nature of his lawful permanent
resident status meant that he was not “permanent” when
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admitted, as required by the statutory definition of “lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.” See INA § 101(a)(20), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (“The term ‘lawfully admitted for
permanent residence’ means the status of having been
lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the
United States as an immigrant in accordance with the
immigration laws, such status not having changed.”).
Alternatively, he urges that, if we find the relevant INA
sections ambiguous, we should remand to the BIA for further
consideration.
However, we conclude that the plain language of the
INA indicates that an alien admitted as a Conditional LPR
constitutes “an alien who has previously been admitted to the
United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence,” INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), and, therefore,
that the BIA correctly determined that the aggravated felony
bar renders Paek statutorily ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver.
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“As with any question of statutory interpretation, our
analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.”
Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009). “[I]n
looking for the meaning of this statutory language, we must
look to the statutory context in which that language is used
and the broader context of the statute as a whole as well as the
language itself.” N.J. Payphone Ass’n v. Town of W. N.Y.,
299 F.3d 235, 245 (3d Cir. 2002). “It is true that, in the face
of statutory ambiguity or uncertainty, we may ‘have recourse
to the legislative history of the measure and the statements by
those in charge of it during its consideration by the
Congress,’” Estate of Arrington v. Michael, 738 F.3d 599,
605 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Great N. Ry.,
287 U.S. 144, 154-55 (1932)); however, “we do not resort to
legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.”
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994). Here,
the statutory text is clear, not ambiguous.
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The aggravated felony bar provides that a § 212(h)
waiver is not available to “an alien who has previously been
admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence if . . . since the date of such admission
the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony . . . .”
INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (emphasis added). We
have already addressed the proper date on which a
Conditional LPR, who had the conditional basis of his status
removed (i.e., who became a Non-conditional LPR), was
admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence. Gallimore, 619 F.3d at 226-27.3 In
Gallimore, the Attorney General argued that the alien, Earl
Gallimore, was not “lawfully admitted for permanent
residence” until the date on which the conditional basis of his
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Gallimore did not turn on the aggravated felony bar; instead,
the issue was the alien’s eligibility for a discretionary waiver
of removal under INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), which
has since been repealed. 619 F.3d at 223.
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immigration status was removed, as opposed to the date on
which he became a Conditional LPR. Id. at 226. We
remanded because “the BIA simply overlooked the fact” that
the date on which Gallimore had become a Conditional LPR
may have been the relevant date. Id. However, in strong and
persuasive dicta, we noted that the provisions in § 216
“unambiguously accord conditional LPRs the privilege of
residing ‘permanently’ in the United States, notwithstanding
the literal meaning of the word ‘permanently’ and the
conditional nature of the status.” Id. at 228. Furthermore, we
proclaimed that “[t]he INA thus equates conditional LPRs
with ‘full-fledged’ LPRs, except to the extent—but only to
the extent—that [§ 216] prescribes additional obligations.”
Id. at 229. While we did opine on this issue, the parties
before us agree—as do we—that this was dicta and not
controlling on remand in that case. 4
4

Paek emphasizes another case, Hanif v. Attorney General,
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Here, the relevant phrase in the aggravated felony bar
is defined by statute: “The term ‘lawfully admitted for
permanent residence’ means the status of having been
lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the
United States as an immigrant in accordance with the
immigration laws, such status not having changed.” INA
§ 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). Of course, “[w]hen a
statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that
definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary
meaning.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000).
The thrust of Paek’s argument is that this definition is not
consistent with Conditional LPR status because, by its very

694 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2012), but that case is not relevant to
our holding here. In Hanif, we determined that, according to
the aggravated felony bar’s “plain meaning,” the bar did not
apply to an alien who “originally entered the country
illegally,” as an illegal alien has not been “admitted” as “an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Id. at 484.
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nature, Conditional LPR status is not “permanent” and indeed
changes.
However, as we did in Gallimore, we must look to the
INA as a whole; in particular, we must consider § 216 and
§ 216A of the INA, which explain the concept of Conditional
LPR status. See Prestol Espinal v. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213,
217 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The Supreme Court has instructed that
‘we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to
its object and policy.’” (quoting United States v. Heirs of
Boisdore, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850))). When we consider
§ 216 and § 216A, we can only conclude that Paek was
“lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” notwithstanding
the conditional nature of his LPR status.
Perhaps most tellingly, § 216 states that “an alien son
or daughter . . . shall be considered, at the time of obtaining
the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
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residence, to have obtained such status on a conditional basis
subject to the provisions of this section.” INA § 216(a)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also INA § 216A,
8 U.S.C. § 1186b(a)(1) (“[A]n alien entrepreneur . . . , alien
spouse, and alien child . . . shall be considered, at the time of
obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, to have obtained such status on a
conditional basis . . . .”). Clearly, Congress contemplated that
a Conditional LPR “obtain[s] the status of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence,” with the only caveat being
that said status is obtained “on a conditional basis.” INA
§ 216(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1).
Lest there be any doubt, § 216 and § 216A refer to “the
second anniversary of the alien’s obtaining the status of
lawful admission for permanent residence” as being
synonymous with the second anniversary of the alien’s
admission as a Conditional LPR. See, e.g., INA § 216(b)(1),
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(c)(2)(A), (c)(3)(B), (d)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1),
(c)(2)(A), (c)(3)(B), (d)(2)(A); INA § 216A(b)(1), (c)(2)(A),
(c)(3)(B), (d)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(b)(1), (c)(2)(A),
(c)(3)(B), (d)(2)(A). For instance, § 216 provides:
In the case of an alien with permanent resident
status on a conditional basis under subsection
(a), if—
(i) no petition is filed with respect to the
alien in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (1)(A), or
(ii) unless there is good cause shown, the
alien spouse and petitioning spouse fail to
appear at the interview described in
paragraph (1)(B),
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
terminate the permanent resident status of the
alien as of the second anniversary of the alien’s
lawful admission for permanent residence.
INA § 216(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(A) (emphases
added). This provision is clearly applicable only “in the case
of an alien with permanent resident status on a conditional
basis,” and it provides that the Secretary of Homeland
Security “shall terminate the permanent resident status of the
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alien as of the second anniversary of the alien’s lawful
admission for permanent residence.” Id. This means that, if
no petition to adjust status is filed within two years of an alien
becoming a Conditional LPR, then the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall terminate the alien’s “permanent resident
status” at the conclusion of those two years. Id. Surely, a
Conditional LPR must have had the status of a “permanent
resident” for two years in order for such status to be
terminated; otherwise, this provision makes no sense.
Indeed, the language of § 216 and § 216A repeatedly
discusses Conditional LPRs having their status of lawful
admission for permanent residence “terminated.” See, e.g.,
INA § 216(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1); INA § 216A(b)(1),
8 U.S.C. § 1186b(b)(1). If a Conditional LPR did not have
“the status of lawful admission for permanent residence,”
then the statutes would not speak of Conditional LPRs having
such status “terminated.” See, e.g., INA § 216(b)(2), 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1186a(b)(2) (“Any alien whose permanent resident status is
terminated under paragraph (1) may request a review of such
determination in a proceeding to remove the alien.”); INA
§ 216(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(A) (“[T]he Secretary
of Homeland Security shall terminate the permanent resident
status of the alien as of the second anniversary of the alien’s
lawful admission for permanent residence.”); INA
§ 216(c)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(B) (“In any removal
proceeding with respect to an alien whose permanent resident
status is terminated . . . .”); INA § 216(c)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1186a(c)(3)(C) (“[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security . . .
shall terminate the permanent resident status of an alien
spouse or an alien son or daughter . . . .”); INA
§ 216(c)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(D) (“Any alien whose
permanent resident status is terminated . . . .”); INA
§ 216A(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(c)(2)(A) (“[T]he Attorney
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General shall terminate the permanent resident status of the
alien . . . .”).
Similarly, § 216 and § 216A provide that a Conditional
LPR becomes a Non-conditional LPR by having “the
conditional basis of such status removed.” INA
§ 216(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(2)(A); accord INA
§ 216A(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(a)(2)(A); see also INA
§ 216(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1) (“In order for the
conditional basis . . . to be removed . . . .”); INA
§ 216(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1)(A) (“[T]he alien
spouse and the petitioning spouse . . . must submit . . . a
petition which requests the removal of such conditional basis
. . . .”); INA § 216(c)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(B)
(“[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security . . . shall remove the
conditional basis of the parties effective as of the second
anniversary of the alien’s obtaining the status of lawful
admission for permanent residence.”); INA § 216(c)(4), 8
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U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security
. . . may remove the conditional basis of the permanent
resident status for an alien . . . .”). That Congress spoke of
the removal of “the conditional basis of such status”
demonstrates that a Conditional LPR had already obtained the
status of “lawful admission for permanent residence.”
Nonetheless, Paek urges that our interpretation of “the
status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence”
is undermined by the fact that § 216(e) singles out
Conditional LPRs and that this provision would be surplusage
if all Conditional LPRs are necessarily lawfully admitted for
permanent residence. Section 216(e) states:
For purposes of subchapter III of this chapter, in
the case of an alien who is in the United States
as a lawful permanent resident on a conditional
basis under this section, the alien shall be
considered to have been admitted as an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence and
to be in the United States as an alien lawfully
admitted to the United States for permanent
residence.
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INA § 216(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(e). Subchapter III relates to
naturalization, and it does not include § 212(h), which is in
subchapter II. Paek argues that, if a Conditional LPR is “an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” Congress
would not need to state that Conditional LPRs are
“considered” to be lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, nor would it have limited § 216(e) to apply only to
“subchapter III.”
The canon against surplusage counsels us to “give[]
effect to every word” of a statute and to avoid rendering a
statute “superfluous,” whether in whole or in part. Marx v.
Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1177 (2013). But we
read § 216(e) not as limiting the situation in which
Conditional LPRs are the same as Non-conditional LPRs, but
rather as clarifying that, for purposes of naturalization, it does
not matter whether an alien is a Conditional LPR or a Non-
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conditional LPR: either way, the naturalization provisions
apply. We believe that Congress desired to clarify that, for
naturalization purposes, a Conditional LPR does not need to
wait for the removal of the conditional basis of his status
before seeking naturalization, and does indeed have the status
of “an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” In
light of all the other passages in § 216 and § 216A cited
above, we do not believe that this instance of purported
surplusage creates any ambiguity as to Congress’s intent for
the aggravated felony bar. 5

We also reject Paek’s invocation of the rule of lenity. See
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 66 (1997) (“The rule
[of lenity] does not apply when a statute is unambiguous or
when invoked to engraft an illogical requirement to its text.”).
Likewise to no avail is Paek’s reliance on the canon that,
where “Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States
v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)). The
fact that Congress did not repeat the cumbersome phrase
5
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Paek urges that certain legislative history, which refers
to Conditional LPR as being a “status” or as otherwise being
different from Non-conditional LPR, indicates that our
conclusion is incorrect. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 99-906, at 7
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5979 (“Creates
a two-year ‘conditional’ status for all alien spouses, sons, and
daughters who become permanent resident aliens . . . .”); id.
at 9, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5981 (“By postponing
the privilege of permanent resident status until two years after
the alien’s obtaining the status of lawful admission for
permanent residence, the bill provides a balanced
approach.”). But, given the clarity and lack of ambiguity in
the statutory text, Paek’s cited legislative history is
unavailing. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147-48. Regardless,
“whether on a conditional basis or otherwise” as a modifier
for “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” in every
instance, as it did in § 216(h)(1) and (h)(2), does not create an
ambiguity in the statute.
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Paek can point to nothing in the legislative history that
indicates that Congress intended the aggravated felony bar to
be inapplicable to Conditional LPRs. Whether the legislative
history refers to Conditional LPR as a separate status or
otherwise contrasts Conditional LPR from Non-conditional
LPR status is of no moment. Simply put, for purposes of the
aggravated felony bar, a Conditional LPR is to be treated the
same as a Non-conditional LPR.
Given that we find no ambiguity in the statute, we
decide this case at step one of the Chevron analysis. We do
not address the issues the parties have raised in connection
with Chevron’s step two, which involve the amount of
deference we should afford to the BIA’s published decision in
this case. However, we remind the BIA that “agencies should
not move away from their previous rulings without cogent
explanation.” Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir.
2006). In two prior unpublished BIA decisions, the BIA held
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that the aggravated felony bar does not apply to an alien
admitted as a Conditional LPR. See, e.g., In re Mata-Rosas,
No. A076-404-712, at 3 (BIA Apr. 20, 2011) (concluding
that, because “the respondent was lawfully admitted as a
conditional lawful permanent resident,” the aggravated felony
bar is inapplicable); In re Peretz, No. A29-832-294, at 4 (BIA
May 25, 1999) (“Furthermore, assuming that the respondent
remained a conditional resident, we do not agree that this
constitutes the functional equivalent of legal permanent
residency for purposes of applying for section 212(h)
relief.”). The BIA’s published decision in Paek’s case
contradicted these two prior rulings, without acknowledging
the contradiction. Perhaps our decision in Gallimore is the
reason for the BIA’s change in position, as the BIA cited
Gallimore in its decision. If so, it is understandable why the
BIA mistakenly believed that Gallimore compelled the result.
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Regardless, issues concerning the amount of deference
owed to the BIA’s decision are irrelevant to our determination
of whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous. We
need not decide what level or type of deference we would
give to the BIA’s decision in Paek’s case because we
conclude that our inquiry ends at step one of the Chevron
analysis: the statutory language of the INA unambiguously
provides that an alien admitted as a Conditional LPR is
subject to the aggravated felony bar.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.

27

